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The South China Sea (hereinafter referred to as the “SCS”) is a marginal sea 
in the western Pacific (see Figure  0.1). The SCS is a typical semi- enclosed 
sea. It is almost entirely surrounded by continent, peninsula, and islands, 
with its north connecting the East China Sea with the Taiwan Strait, its east 
connecting the Pacific Ocean with many straits, and its southwest connecting 
the Indian Ocean with the Strait of Malacca. The northern part of the SCS 
connects Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Fujian, and Taiwan of China. The 
eastern and southeastern part is adjacent to the Philippines. The southern part 
connects Malaysia and Brunei, including Kalimantan Island. The western 
and southwestern parts adjoin Vietnam and the Malay Peninsula (Zhang 
2014, 11– 12). Clockwise from the north, six coastal States surround the SCS, 
namely China (including China’s Taiwan), the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam.
The SCS hosts many territorial and sovereignty disputes, involving mul-
tiple coastal States, and it is often regarded as one of the biggest security and 
political threats to the Asia- Pacific region. The claimant states have sought to 
solve problems through bilateral negotiations to delimitate maritime bound-
aries, or to manage potential conflicts through making rules such as the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea or the Code 
of Conduct (COC), which is currently under discussion. Against this back-
drop, some claimant states also advocate the joint development or coopera-
tive development of living and non- living resources in the disputed waters to 
ease tensions in the SCS while simultaneously sharing the economic benefit 
from developing natural resources. Some Southeast Asian countries, such as 
Malaysia and Thailand, have set commendable examples of successful joint 
development.
This edited volume is a collective work of contributors from each of the 
six coastal countries in the SCS. Different from previous works on similar 
topics, which take an approach based on international laws, this book 
provides an alternative analytical approach. With backgrounds mostly as pol-
itical scientists, policymakers, or policy consultants, the contributors to this 
volume keep a sharp eye on the changing dynamics of the interplay between 
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Figure 0.1  Map of the South China Sea
Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map are not necessarily authoritative.
Source: This map is based on the following sources: United Nations (2012); Flanders 






ground their analysis on rich historical evidence. The concerns that they raise 
in this volume, which may impede joint development ventures and the policy 
orientations that they point to, are particularly useful for those interested in 
the ongoing SCS dispute and ways out of conflict.
Concepts of joint development and cooperative development
The concept of “joint development” is used frequently by the authors in this 
book. Joint development here refers to:
[a] procedure under which boundary disputes are set aside, without preju-
dice to the validity of the conflicting claims, and the interested states agree, 
instead, to jointly explore and exploit and to share any hydrocarbons 
found in the area subject to overlapping claims.
(Shihata and Onorato 1998, 434)
In this book, joint development focuses on sea areas with overlapping 
maritime claims. If  the interested states have signed a maritime boundary 
delimitation agreement, even if  they have agreed to jointly explore and exploit 
any transboundary hydrocarbons, this is not viewed as joint development. 
For example, China and Vietnam signed the Agreement on the Delimitation 
of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in 
the Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin) in December 2000, which went into effect 
in June 2004. Not long after, the two countries discussed joint exploration 
and exploitation of transboundary oil/ gas resources. In November 2005, 
a China– Vietnam joint statement spoke of “joint exploration and exploit-
ation on transboundary oil/ gas structure in the Beibu Gulf” (Government of 
China 2005); similarly in June 2013, a China– Vietnam joint statement spoke 
of “joint exploration on transboundary oil/ gas structure in the Beibu Gulf” 
(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a). Nowhere did these two bilateral 
joint statements mention the term “joint development” in the Beibu Gulf.
In the spirit of joint development, some countries advocate the concept of 
“cooperative development,” which has a more elastic meaning. The concept 
of cooperative development appears in a Memorandum of Understanding 
on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, signed by the governments of 
China and the Philippines in November 2018 (Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2018). The title of the 2018 China– Philippines memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) refers to “Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development” 
rather than joint development. While the MOU mentions “oil and gas explor-
ation and exploitation in relevant maritime areas consistent with applicable 
rules of international law,” there is no definition of the areas considered “rele-
vant.” Presumably, relevant maritime areas include sites previously targeted for 
joint development, such as Liyue Tan (Reed Bank); but they could include any 
other areas identified by both parties, even undisputed areas that China does 
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According to this analysis of the 2018 China– Philippines MOU, the con-
cept of “cooperative development” can pertain to areas with or without mari-
time boundary disputes. The subjects of cooperative development can be 
either states or companies, and it can be implemented consistent with one 
claimant state’s laws. Cooperative development enables a broader framework 
for claimant countries to work together to explore and/ or exploit hydrocarbon 
resources.
In fact, the nature of cooperative development can be found in the 
Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue between China and Japan 
in June 2008 (the 2008 Consensus), despite the term not showing up in the 
official document. According to the 2008 Consensus, China and Japan define 
a small block in the northern part of the East China Sea for joint develop-
ment. At the same time, under the 2008 Consensus, Chinese enterprises wel-
come the participation of Japanese corporations in the development of the 
existing Chunxiao (also known as Shirakaba) oil and gas field in accordance 
with the relevant laws of China (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008b). 
The Chunxiao oil and gas field is located on the Chinese side of a Japanese- 
claimed “median line” (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). Chinese 
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Dawei argued that the development of 
the Chunxiao field is a kind of cooperative development, not a joint devel-
opment (Government of China 2008). According to China, the Chunxiao 
oil and gas field remains within the sovereignty of China and has absolutely 
nothing to do with joint development (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2008a). In contrast, Japan regards investing in the development of Chunxiao 
as joint development (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). Wu Dawei 
stressed that China does not recognize the so- called “median line” claimed by 
Japan, and the 2008 Consensus, without prejudice to China’s sovereign rights 
and jurisdictions in the East China Sea (Government of China 2008).
In this book, some authors also use the concept of cooperative devel-
opment in reference to creation of a common “fishing zone” and/ or fish-
eries agreement in an overlapping area (see Chapter  10 by Song Xue and 
Huaigao Qi).
Why does the title of this book refer to cooperative development instead 
of joint development? One reason is the significant lack of clarity in mari-
time claims by the SCS coastal States in the Spratly Islands area. Lack of 
clarity on overlapping claim areas has been one of the major difficulties in 
reaching joint development agreements. To facilitate oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation in relevant maritime areas, it’s a realistic choice for claimants 
to replace the concept of joint development with cooperative development.
The other reason is that the concept of cooperative development can accom-
modate all the authors’ concerns on oil and gas exploration and exploitation 
among the SCS coastal States. Some authors in this book use the concept 
of joint development; some use other concepts, such as “joint cooperation” 
(Chapter 1 by Jolene Hui Yun Liew), “commercial arrangement” (Chapter 4 











Rabena). Authors’ use of different concepts is not wordplay, but determined 
by the official policies of claimants.
Moreover, according to the definition of joint development, which pertains 
to a disputed area only, some states have concerns that by entering into a 
joint development deal they risk confirming the existence of a territorial dis-
pute where they lay sovereignty claims, thus undermining their claims, des-
pite Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) ruling that provisional arrangements such as joint devel-
opment will “be without prejudice to the final delimitation.” In contrast to 
the rigidness of joint development, cooperative development provides more 
flexibility, especially regarding the delimitation of cooperative development 
zones, which can include both disputed and non- disputed areas. Therefore, 
cooperative development can offer a more neutral approach to developing 
hydrocarbon resources jointly in the SCS.
The relevant literatures on cooperative development/ joint development in 
the SCS include the following. The Environment and Policy Institute (EAPI)/ 
Co- ordinating Committee on Offshore Prospecting (CCOP) Workshop, East- 
West Center, provided recommendations on the exploration and exploitation 
of hydrocarbon resources of the SCS (Valencia 1981). Valencia, Van Dyke, 
and Ludwig (1991, 3)  reviewed several types of organization that might be 
established to manage the commons area and its resources, ranging from 
the loose Spratly Coordinating Agency to the robust Spratly Management 
Authority. Miyoshi (1999) discussed the relations between joint development 
and maritime boundary delimitation, and analyzed the Malaysia– Thailand 
Memorandum of Understanding of 21 February 1979 and the Malaysia– 
Vietnam Memorandum of Understanding of 5 June 1992. Beckman et  al. 
(2013, 6) explored forms of joint offshore resource development and provided 
a “toolbox” of options to address the management and governance of areas 
of overlapping maritime claims in the SCS. Wu and Hong (2014) tested 
the applicability of a joint development regime in the SCS and explored 
the prospect of the joint development of resources as a way to successfully 
manage conflict in the SCS. Beckman (2015, 261– 264) summarized nine 
recommendations for moving forward on joint development in the SCS. Yang 
et al. (2016, 146– 149) summarized seven legal aspects related to joint devel-
opment in the SCS as follows: joint development member states, joint devel-
opment zones, contract modes, management mechanisms, fiscal and taxation 
systems, environmental protection, and nontraditional security threats. Shao 
(2018) summarized successful joint development cases involving Southeast 
Asian countries and discussed their implications for China and the other SCS 
coastal States.
Recent state practices among SCS coastal States
The SCS hosts many disputes, partly due to its large hydrocarbon reserves 
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Administration (2013) estimates that there are approximately 11  billion 
barrels of oil reserves and 190  trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves in 
the SCS. There are more than 30 oil- and gas- bearing basins and 397 oil and 
gas platforms in the SCS (China State Geospatial Information Center 2017). 
Figure 0.2 features 18 major oil- and gas- bearing basins in the SCS. In the 
north part of the SCS, the major oil- and gas- bearing basins are: Taixinan 
(Southwestern Taiwan) Basin, Taiwan Strait and Western Taiwan Basin, 
Zhujiang Kou (Pearl River Mouth) Basin, Qiongdongnan Basin, Beibu 
(Tonkin) Gulf Basin, Yingge Sea (Song Hong) Basin, and Bijia’nan Basin. In 
the south part of the SCS, the major oil- and gas- bearing basins are: Wan’an 
(Tu Chinh, Vanguard Bank) Basin, Nanwei’xi Basin, Nanwei’dong Basin, 
Malay Basin, Zengmu (East Natuna and Sarawak) Basin, Brunei- Sabah 
Basin, Liyue (Reed Bank) Basin, Palawan Basin, Beikang Basin, Andu’bei 
Basin, and Jiuzhang Basin (see Figure 0.2). Due to the presumed large off-
shore oil and gas reserves in the SCS, the region is sometimes labeled the “new 
Persian Gulf.”
Cooperative development/ joint development has been widely accepted 
as a provisional arrangement of  a practical nature that can be used by 
countries with boundary disputes to manage their disagreements, without 
prejudice to the validity of  the conflicting claims. It is also encouraged by 
UNCLOS for the management of  boundary disputes. Successful coopera-
tive development/ joint development creates a benevolent atmosphere 
for claimants to negotiate on delimitation issues while, at the same time, 
allowing conflicting parties to reap economic benefits from the exploitation 
of  natural resources.
Given the competitive element in SCS disputes, it is fortunate that all the 
SCS coastal States share a similar vision of peace, development, and cooper-
ation. The SCS coastal States actively search for solutions to their maritime 
disputes. Cooperative development/ joint development may, therefore, be 
considered by the SCS coastal States as an ad hoc arrangement to prevent 
potential conflict and to promote win- win situations.
In fact, cooperative development/ joint development initiatives in the SCS 
are not without precedent. In February 1979, Malaysia and Thailand signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom of 
Thailand on the Establishment of the Joint Authority for the Exploitation 
of the Resources of the Sea Bed in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf  
of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand. In July 1982, Cambodia and 
Vietnam signed an Agreement on Historic Waters of Vietnam and Kampuchea 
(Kittichaisaree 1987, 180– 181). In December 1989, Indonesia and Australia 
signed a Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone 
of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor 
and Northern Australia. In May 1990, Malaysia and Thailand signed an 
Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters Relating 





1992, Malaysia and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the Exploration 
and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of the Continental Shelf  
Involving the Two Countries.
In December 2000, Vietnam and China signed an Agreement on Fishery 
Cooperation in the Beibu Gulf Area between the Government of the People’s 
Figure 0.2  Illustrative map of oil- and gas- bearing basins in the SCS
Note: This map is for illustration only.
Source: This map is based on the following sources: Qi (2019, 222); Wang (2013, 415); 
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Republic of China and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000). In March 2009, Prime Minister 
of Malaysia Abdullah Badawi and Brunei’s Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah signed 
an Exchange of Letters (EOL) (Smith 2010), With the EOL, Malaysia 
dropped its claim to the two oil blocks, but both countries also designated 
the two blocks as a commercial arrangement area to be jointly explored by 
Brunei and Malaysia (Ong 2013, 206– 207). In January 2012, Malaysia and 
Indonesia signed an MOU on Common Guidelines Concerning Treatment 
of Fishermen by Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies of Malaysia and the 
Republic of Indonesia (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). The 
experience of, and lessons learned around, the commercialization of Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and other ASEAN States could be adopted for 
future cooperative development/ joint development in the SCS.
China has been in discussion with other coastal States on the coopera-
tive development/ joint development of the SCS since the 1980s. During the 
late 1980s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping proposed managing SCS problems 
by putting disputes aside in order to prioritize joint development (Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). In September 2004, China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation and the Philippine National Oil Company signed 
an Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Understanding in an area of about 
142,886 square kilometers in the SCS (CNOOC and PNOC 2004). Then, in 
November 2004, these two companies also subscribed to an agreement on 
joint oil and gas exploration in the disputed area. Furthermore, a Tripartite 
Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in 
the South China Sea was reached by oil companies in China, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam in March 2005, with the aim of conducting research on pet-
roleum resource potential (Chinese Embassy in the Philippines 2005; 
Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). This marked a positive step, 
encouraging other SCS coastal States to follow. What’s more, in April 2013 
China and Brunei signed a joint statement in support of relevant enterprises 
in the two countries carrying out joint exploration and exploitation of mari-
time oil and gas resources (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013b). China 
and Vietnam’s joint statement in November 2015 declared that the two coun-
tries would actively negotiate on joint development in the area off  the mouth 
of the Beibu Gulf (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).
Considering each coastal State’s familiarity with cooperative development/ 
joint development, the drafting of the ASEAN– China COC, and the relatively 
calm maritime situation since 2017, there is much hope for productive rounds 
of cooperative development/ joint development dialogue among the coastal 
States in the SCS. China and Vietnam agreed to foster joint development in 
the waters off  the mouth of the Beibu Gulf and to continue to promote the 
efforts of the working group on joint development at sea (Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2017). According to China and the Philippines’ Memorandum 
of Understanding on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, signed 













accelerated basis arrangements to facilitate oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation in relevant maritime areas” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2018). In October 2019, China and the Philippines convened the first meeting 
of the China– Philippines Inter- Governmental Joint Steering Committee 
on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development (Philippines Department of 
Foreign Affairs 2019).
Two conditions are necessary before there can be serious discussion on 
cooperative development/ joint development arrangements (Beckman et  al. 
2013). First, joint development arrangements tend to be concluded in periods 
where good relations exist among the relevant parties. China and other coastal 
States in the SCS have taken steps to build confidence and trust among the 
claimants. New progress in the SCS, such as the ASEAN– China single 
draft negotiating text for the COC, are conducive to creating benign bilat-
eral relations, which serve as a prerequisite to joint development. If  benign 
relations can be established between China and other coastal States in the 
SCS, the first condition for joint development is met. Second, the parties must 
have the political will to make decisions that may face opposition within their 
own countries. China and other coastal States in the SCS are taking steps to 
reinforce among the public the underlying rationale for joint development 
and the advantages of pursuing this option, indicating that the second condi-
tion for joint development involves a process towards consensus.
Structure of the book
This book consists of ten chapters. From Chapter 1 to Chapter 6, the book 
analyzes the cooperative development/ joint development policies of the 
six SCS coastal States, namely Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam. Chapter 7 analyzes the US approach to joint devel-
opment in the SCS, which plays an important third- party role. Chapter  8 
analyzes business connectivity among industrial parks in the SCS rim, which 
is related to cooperative development in the SCS. Chapter  9 is a theoret-
ical analysis of the conditions related to the failure of implementation of 
joint development agreements. Chapter 10 provides an in- depth analysis of 
the policies and prospects for cooperative development in the SCS. All the 
authors of this book are from the SCS coastal States. They hope to clear up 
misunderstandings and assuage doubts concerning cooperative development, 
as well as shedding light on creative ways to promote cooperative develop-
ment in the SCS.
In Chapter 1, Jolene Hui Yun Liew reviews Brunei’s ongoing cases of joint 
development/ joint cooperation with neighboring states Malaysia, China, and 
Vietnam. Liew points out three factors that have greatly influenced Brunei’s 
positive stance towards joint development/ joint cooperation in the SCS with 
its neighbors: Brunei’s nonconfrontational approach; the country’s wider eco-
nomic diversification strategy; and the rather lax geopolitical atmosphere in the 
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joint development from taking place between Brunei and its neighbors: the 
functional shortage of a new generation of Bruneian researchers; the lack 
of major breakthroughs by Brunei’s existing cooperative models; and the 
more complex geopolitical environment in this region today. In the face of 
the current predicaments, Liew makes two recommendations: first, focus on 
and enhance cooperation based on the existing bilateral joint development 
model, then discuss a multilateral joint development model later; second, as 
a starting point, claimants could consider cooperating on less sensitive areas 
of the SCS.
In Chapter  2, Huaigao Qi discusses China’s economic and strategic 
incentives for its cooperative development/ joint development initiatives with 
Vietnam and the Philippines since 2017. The economic incentives encompass 
a broad spectrum of goals, including the domestic demand for energy, the con-
struction of a “21st- Century Maritime Silk Road,” the Hainan pilot free trade 
zone, and construction of a common market and future economic integration 
among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives are achieving its 
goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing a constructive role in 
maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other 
coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China– US competition in the 
SCS. China may prioritize a few policies to endorse cooperative development/ 
joint development: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit 
unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of 
the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing a 
relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there 
are only two claimants; and sixth, to define sea areas for joint development by 
seeking consensus.
Indonesia, a non- claimant country in the SCS, is also a keen stakeholder in 
the discussion of cooperative development/ joint development. In Chapter 3, 
Evi Fitriani recalls that Indonesia has been actively involved in promoting 
negotiations on SCS disputes and has been acting as a mediator since the 
early 1990s. Despite various efforts made to encourage dispute resolution and 
joint development, severe problems persist that hinder the negotiations of 
joint development, which include states’ unwillingness to make concessions, 
a lack of strategic trust, and the inadequate engagement of nonstate actors 
who weigh up the benefits of regional identity over national state identity. 
Disputes also occur when states try to decide on the boundaries of joint 
development zones, because states tend to pursue joint development in terri-
tories that lay outside their claims. To make states agree on the field to joint 
development is also problematic because states want to gain more economic 
benefit than their counterpart and rarely complement their preferred fields of 
cooperation with other states’ preferences. A  free- rider attitude encourages 
states to only concentrate on profitable fields, while the common good, such 
as marine conservation, is more often than not ignored. Besides, with regard 
to the question of “who” is eligible to participate in joint development, the 




could be involved is changing over time. It is suggested that taking a multilat-
eral, informal approach and involving youth could help to solve the deadlock 
of joint development in the future.
In Chapter 4, Ngeow Chow- Bing discusses prospects for Sino– Malaysian 
joint development in the SCS by examining the existing cases of Malaysia’s 
experiences in maritime joint development with its neighbors. These cases 
include the Malaysia– Thailand Joint Development Authority, the Malaysia– 
Vietnam Commercial Arrangement Area, the Malaysia– Brunei Commercial 
Arrangement Area, and the Malaysia– Indonesia MOU on Fisheries. 
Common factors in the successful implementation of these cases include: all 
the disputes arise from continental shelf  claims, which renders the negotiation 
of joint development more of a technical issue than a sovereignty conflict; 
all of these disputes were confined to disagreements over maritime bound-
aries, rather than sovereignty disputes; maintaining amicable relations with 
neighbors prevails over disputes; economic and technical imperatives were in 
place for both parties to enter into a joint development cooperation; and, 
finally, public aloofness on the disputes in Malaysia enabled policymakers to 
make decisions. However, in the case of joint development between Malaysia 
and China in the SCS, these favorable factors are either absent or only par-
tially fulfilled. Nevertheless, proposals are put forward in support of explor-
ation in the area by Malaysia and China.
In Chapter  5, Aaron Jed Rabena examines the drivers and conditions 
that both enable and impair the prospects of Philippine joint development 
with China in the SCS. The drivers and conditions are determined by the 
following factors: the foreign policy strategy of the ruling government, prag-
matism (energy security), and the desire to avoid a confrontational dispos-
ition vis- à- vis China. He also examines the political and legal challenges for 
the Philippines’ joint development with China in the SCS and recommends 
five measures necessary for this to succeed: maintenance of the status quo; 
finalization of the COC; improvement of Philippine and Chinese communi-
cation strategies to avoid misperceptions; adoption of a proper legal cover; 
and establishment of a fisheries agreement or bilateral mechanism for marine 
environmental protection in the SCS.
In Chapter  6, Bui Thi Thu Hien discusses Vietnam’s cooperative devel-
opment in the SCS, looking at the existing cases, challenges, and policy 
suggestions. The Vietnamese government’s position on cooperative develop-
ment is reflected in its participation in international conventions as well as 
the Communist Party of Vietnam’s resolutions and Vietnam’s internal law 
documents. Bui Thi analyzes the 1992 Malaysia– Vietnam MOU, the 2000 
Sino– Vietnamese Fishery Agreement, and the 2005 Tripartite Agreement. 
She puts forward eight policy suggestions on Vietnam– China cooperative 
development in the SCS: (1) achieve the highest consensus of domestic public 
opinion; (2)  strengthen closer ties with other countries around the SCS; 
(3) begin with less sensitive issues; (4) make parallel efforts to speed up the 
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land and at sea, with the aim of creating mutual interaction; (6) strengthen 
mutual trust; (7) develop an effective mechanism for a media campaign on 
cooperative development activities; and (8) promote negotiations aiming to 
set up a maritime cooperation fund.
The US is considered the most important third party in SCS disputes. 
The US always looms in the background despite seldom meddling directly 
in joint development implementation in the area. In Chapter 7, Nong Hong 
claims that US concerns in the SCS are limited to navigational rights, a legally 
binding Code of Conduct, and maritime domination. Joint development in 
the SCS has neither been a topic of comment nor the subject of a stand- alone 
or joint statement by the US government. As for US experts, academics, and 
think tanks, joint development has never been discussed in any systematic 
way. The only time there has been a focus on the issue was in late November 
2018 when Chinese President Xi Jinping was in Manila and there was much 
anxiety that Duterte would “sell out” on the issue of joint development in the 
Philippines– China Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Oil 
and Gas Development. The US energy industry might wish to play a bigger 
role in resource development in the SCS, in the form of joint ventures, in 
circumstances where the claimant states have clearly overcome the political 
and legal hurdles that have existed for decades.
In Chapter 8, Siswo Pramono and Bayu Rahmat Novita review the current 
situation in the SCS and argue that, while disputes continue, these are less 
violent than was the case decades ago. Most parties are willing to enhance 
regional stability and prosperity, which leaves ample space for cooperation. 
They evaluate the common traits of the economies of the littoral states and 
find that all of them, including China, suffer to some degree from politico- 
economic fragility. Improving national resilience through economic and social 
development would allow the respective parties to address that fragility. The 
two authors explore the relevant aspects of the ASEAN concept on a variety 
of economic zones, with a particular focus on industrial parks. They propose 
that industrial parks in the SCS rim will contribute to regional prosperity and 
trust- building, which will support long- term settlement of potential and real 
disputes.
In Chapter 9, Song Xue explores the conditions related to failure in imple-
mentation of joint development agreements. Applying the Crisp- set qualita-
tive comparative analysis method to 19 joint development agreements that 
took place between 1958 and 2008, Xue distinguishes four aspects which 
often put obstacles in the way of joint development experiments: domestic 
politics, laws and security; foreign relations; economic incentives; and factors 
associated with joint development arrangements. Xue argues that the only 
condition causally related to failed joint development is the deterioration 
of bilateral relations, mostly related to the boundary dispute itself; contrary 
to common assumptions, lack of economic incentive, energy independence, 
domestic oppositions, third- party intervention, and disagreement over joint 





joint development. This finding implies that improving bilateral relations is a 
prerequisite for implementing joint development, not the other way around. It 
is suggested that claimant states take the provisional and non- prejudice clause 
in UNCLOS seriously and that they do not try to use joint development as a 
pretext to secretively consolidate a controversial boundary claim or confirm 
the status of a “dispute.”
The concluding chapter summarizes the policy recommendations 
proposed in the previous chapters. The increasing imbalance of  power 
among claimants in the SCS has created a tendency to politicize all issues 
related to boundary disputes in the area. The joint development of  hydro-
carbon resources in disputed waters falls victim to geopolitical calculations 
and the zero- sum game mindset more often today than it did two decades 
ago. Understanding how interstate relations and domestic politics affect 
joint development provides a good angle for assessing the failure of  pre-
vious joint development initiatives and finding ways to rebuild confidence 
on maritime cooperation. We put forward two approaches for promoting 
cooperative initiatives. One highlights restricting the relative gains mindset 
by: (1) investigating the misuse of  the term “joint development” for political 
purposes rather than economic purposes; (2) finding alternative legal covers 
on a case- by- case basis to promote cooperative development; (3)  reinfor-
cing the non- prejudicial clause in provisional arrangements; and (4)  con-
trolling tensions by building political trust and making rules to regulate 
actions and collectively manage resources in the SCS. The other approach 
highlights encouraging a non- zero- sum game mindset by: (1) restoring con-
fidence in cooperative development arrangements by focusing on attainable 
goals; (2)  redesigning the incentive structure of  cooperative development 
agreements by encouraging reciprocity between signatory states; (3)  pro-
viding a certain level of  transparency of  knowledge and policy orientation 
to inspire academic discussions and innovative ideas on cooperation; and 
(4) paying attention to public perception of  cooperative developments and 
correcting misperceptions if  necessary.
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